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“The Experience and Good Thinking Foreign
Sources May Convey”: Justice Ginsburg and
the Use of Foreign Law
Jeremy Waldron*
This Article is an appreciation of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's defense of the
Supreme Court's use of foreign law, particularly her arguments about what our courts
can learn from the work that foreign courts have done. The Article extends and
develops Justice Ginsburg's account, drawing an analogy between courts learning from
one another, and scientists learning from one another in a community of inquiry.

* University Professor, New York University Law School. Some material in this Article is
drawn from chapter four of my book, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in
American Courts (forthcoming Yale University Press 2012).
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I.
In the debate about the citation of foreign law that exploded in 2005
1
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a distinguished proponent of the
view that there can be no objection to a court’s referring to the decisions
of other courts in the course of its own reasoning and that much is to be
gained in the way of insight and learning from close attention to the way
in which foreign courts solve problems that are similar or analogous to
the problems that we face. “Foreign opinions,” she says, “are not
authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge. But they
can add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying
2
questions.”
True, she acknowledges that the United States has been a leader,
not a follower, in the establishment of modern constitutionalism, but she
quotes with approval Judge Guido Calabresi’s observation that “[w]ise
3
parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.” In Justice
Ginsburg’s view, the learning should go on in both directions. It is, she
says, a matter of “comparative dialogue,” not just learning from others,
4
but sharing with them. The solutions that we have found for certain legal
problems that are analogous to the problems that they face are evidently
helpful to them.
Let me offer a mundane example to illustrate that point. Some years
ago, a court in New Zealand followed American lines of reasoning in the
5
course of disposing of a case about flag burning. The case was
Hopkinson v Police, concerning a young man who set fire to a flag on the
grounds of the New Zealand Parliament, protesting a visit by the
Australian Prime Minister over some concern about Australian
6
participation in the second Iraq war. He was arrested, charged, and
convicted under the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981, a
1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). But the debate had been simmering in a line of cases concerning the use
of foreign law in decisions about the death penalty. See generally Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002)
(denying certiorari); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999)
(denying certiorari, but debating the role of foreign law in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence);
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
2. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 26 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 187, 190 (2007).
3. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 351, 352 (2005).
This is a slightly different version of the article cited supra note 2. The quote came from Judge
Calabresi’s opinion in United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).
4. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 188.
5. Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC), ¶¶ 50, 66 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)).
6. Id. ¶ 4.
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statute that makes it an offense to destroy the New Zealand flag with the
7
intention of dishonoring it. Mr. Hopkinson appealed his conviction on
the ground that burning a flag in protest was not a way of dishonoring
the national symbol, at least not under any interpretation of “dishonor”
that would avoid conflict with the free speech provisions of the New
8
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“NZBORA”).
The New Zealand court followed the order of inquiry laid down in
9
American cases like Texas v. Johnson, deciding first whether protection
of the flag was a legitimate legislative goal, and only then turning to the
inquiry about whether an across-the-board prohibition on flag burning
10
was an appropriately tailored measure to use in pursuit of that goal. The
New Zealand judge also cited a New Jersey precedent as persuasive
authority for the proposition that “dishonoring” the flag may have, for
the purposes of the NZBORA, a limited meaning that does not
11
necessarily comprehend ceremonial burning as a political act.
Hopkinson is a case of minor importance, and I very much doubt
that it has come to Justice Ginsburg’s attention. But it illustrates in a
usefully mundane way the proposition that countries venturing in
relatively recent times into rights-based review can and do pay attention
to the work of legal systems that have been doing it for centuries. I call
the case “usefully mundane” precisely because it is not a momentous
decision taken at the apex of a court system but just business as usual in a
12
relatively low-level appeal. This was nothing fancy, just a case before an
ordinary working judge. But it did involve the citation of foreign law.
Reading it helps us to see that what seems like a big deal in the

7. Id. ¶¶ 1, 13. Section 11 of the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981 states:
“Offences involving New Zealand Flag: (1) Every person commits an offence against this Act
who . . . (b) in or within view of any public place, uses, displays, destroys, or damages the New Zealand
Flag in any manner with the intention of dishonouring it.”
8. Hopkinson, 3 NZLR ¶¶ 22–24. New Zealand has a form of very weak judicial review, which
requires courts to choose, among available interpretations of offending statutes, those that are most
congenial to the letter and the spirit of the NZBORA. Under Section 14 of NZBORA, “[e]veryone
has the right to freedom of expression.” Section 6 of the NZBORA directs an interpretation consistent
with the Bill of Rights to be preferred “[w]herever an enactment can be given a meaning that is
consistent with the rights and freedoms” in the Bill of Rights. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,
pt. 1, § 6.
9. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
10. Hopkinson, 3 NZLR ¶¶ 43–77.
11. Id. ¶ 79 (citing State v. Schlueter, 23 A.2d 249, 251 (N.J. 1941)).
12. Justice France, who decided Hopkinson, is now on the New Zealand Court of Appeal, but the
High Court in which she sat in this case is just one step up from the district court where Mr.
Hopkinson was initially convicted. (There are two appellate levels above the High Court in New
Zealand: the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.) The Role of the Courts, Courts of New
Zealand, http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/about/system/role/overview (last visited May 1, 2012); The
Judges of the Court of Appeal, Courts of New Zealand, http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/about/
appeal/judges (last visited May 1, 2012).
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American context is often done quite easily and without fuss in other
courts, high and low, around the world.
Perhaps we should say, then, that if courts in other countries are
willing to do this and show themselves capable of doing it, we in the
United States, in our turn, should not be shy about occasionally seeking
enlightenment for our own problem solving from the laws and decisions
13
of other nations. As Justice Ginsburg puts it,
[i]f U.S. experience and decisions can be instructive to systems that
have more recently instituted or invigorated judicial review for
constitutionality, so we can learn from others including Canada, South
Africa, and most recently the U.K.—now engaged in measuring
ordinary laws and executive actions against charters securing basic
14
rights.

After all, as she points out, “[j]udges in the United States are free to
consult all manner of commentary—Restatements, Treatises, what law
15
professors or even law students write copiously in law reviews.” If these
can be cited, then why not the similarly erudite analysis “contained in an
opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, the German Constitutional Court, or the European Court
16
of Human Rights?”
Other Supreme Court Justices have joined Justice Ginsburg in her
defense of this practice. Justice Breyer has spoken of “the enormous
value in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of
17
others.” The practice of citing foreign law, he says, “involves opening
your eyes to what is going on elsewhere, taking what you learn for what
it is worth, and using it as a point of comparison where doing so will
18
prove helpful.” Former Justice O’Connor believes that “there is much
to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the
19
same difficult issues that we face here.” She says,
Other legal systems continue to innovate, to experiment, and to find
new solutions to the new legal problems that arise each day; they offer
much from which we can learn and benefit. . . . Our flexibility—our
ability to borrow ideas from other legal systems—is what will enable us
to remain progressive, with systems that can cope with a rapidly
20
shrinking world.

13. See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 187.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 193.
16. Id.
17. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 265, 266 (2003).
18. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 Int’l J. Const. L. 519, 524
(2005).
19. Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 348, 350 (2002).
20. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice
234–35 (2003).
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II.
21
In a comment published in 2005, shortly after the decision in Roper
v. Simmons, I expressed some concern that we do not yet have anything
like a good jurisprudential theory of the citation of foreign law,
comparable (say) to the theories that we have for the citation of
22
precedents:
The theory that is called for is not necessarily a complete
jurisprudence. But it has to be complicated enough to answer a host of
questions raised by the practice: about the authority accorded foreign
law (persuasive versus conclusive), about the areas in which foreign
law should and should not be cited (private law, for example,
compared to constitutional law), and about which foreign legal systems
23
should be cited (only democracies, for example, or tyrannies as well).

It has to be convincing enough to dispel the serious misgivings that many
Americans have about this practice in relation to their national
24
sovereignty and their values of democracy and self-determination.
Above all, it has to be a theory of law, a theory that treats the citation of
foreign decisions not just as a rather good idea, but as something that can
25
be integrated into a coherent jurisprudence.
The practice need not be defended as immune to abuse. In his
dissent in Roper, Justice Scalia said that the Court’s citation of foreign
26
law was unprincipled and opportunistic. But it does not follow that
there cannot be a good theory to support such a practice. Using my
analogy again, Justice Scalia has sometimes claimed that the Court’s
following and departing from precedent is unprincipled and
27
opportunistic. But this does not mean he rejects stare decisis or that he
thinks it is not worth developing a theory of precedent. Similarly, we
should not reject the idea of a theory of the citation of foreign law simply
because we see judges cite foreign law opportunistically; we should reject
it only if we think unprincipled citation is inevitable under the auspices of
28
such a theory.
Justice Ginsburg’s comments point us in the direction of one line of
29
theoretical justification. The justification Justice Ginsburg advances

21. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 129–31
(2005). The two following paragraphs are drawn from these pages.
22. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (2008); Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent (2008).
23. Waldron, supra note 21, at 129–30.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Waldron, supra note 21, at
130.
27. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 586–87 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Waldron, supra note 21, at 130–31.
28. Waldron, supra note 21, at 131.
29. There are other lines worth exploring, too, such as the idea that in areas of fundamental rights

Waldron_63-HLJ-1243 (Do Not Delete)

1248

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

6/24/2012 8:29 PM

[Vol. 63:1243

rests on the idea that our courts can learn from what other courts in
other countries are doing when they address questions that are the same
or substantially similar to questions we are addressing.
Before I address these issues in depth, I should mention in addition
that Justice Ginsburg has also made a start in the rebuttal of some of the
more common objections to this practice. Against those who worry about
differences in the circumstances—legal, social, and political—in which
foreign decisions are made, she says, “Yes, we should approach foreign
legal materials with sensitivity to our differences,” but she insists that
such sensitivity by itself “should not lead us to abandon the effort to
learn what we can from the experience and good thinking foreign sources
30
may convey.” This is surely right: Lawyers relate principles and
precedents to differences of circumstance all the time; it is one of the
31
things we are supposed to be good at. We do it for case-by-case
reasoning, we do it when we rely on old American precedents for
modern constitutional decisions, and constitutional originalists have to
do it all the time to bring the sayings of the Founding Fathers into some
intelligent relation with circumstances today that are massively different
from those of 1787. Justice Ginsburg also addresses the deficiencies and
imperfections that may characterize the citation of foreign law at the
moment. We must be sensitive to these, she says, and make an effort to
correct the imperfections, but again that is no reason to discontinue the
32
practice as opposed to trying to improve it.
Finally, she addresses the objection from democracy, insisting first
that it must be answered in the context of the already accepted practice
of strong judicial review: We must begin by taking notice of “the fact that
the judiciary is an undemocratic institution—at least the federal judiciary

it is good to have a degree of consistency or integrity throughout the world as well as within particular
legal systems. I have elaborated that rather difficult argument elsewhere, and I will not pursue it in the
present Article. See Jeremy Waldron, Treating Like Cases Alike in the World: The Theoretical Basis of
the Demand for Legal Unity, in Highest Courts and Globalisation 99 (Sam Muller & Sidney
Richards eds., 2010); Jeremy Waldron, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in
American Courts, ch. 5 (forthcoming Yale University Press 2012) [hereinafter Waldron, All
Mankind]. This second line of argument is particularly important for thinking about cases where the
Court seems to be simply invoking statistics about foreign law—for instance, what proportion of
countries have the juvenile death penalty—rather than gleaning insights from particular opinions. For
this point, see Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 148,
151–53 (2005), and Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653, 681 (2009). However, there has been some suggestion in
the literature that we can learn even from the sheer numbers, in the spirit of Condorcet’s jury
theorem. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 131, 140–
43 (2006) (drawing upon Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the
Theory of Decision-Making, in Condorcet: Selected Writings 33, 48–49 (Keith Michael Baker ed.,
1976)).
30. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190.
31. I argue this at length in Waldron, All Mankind, supra note 29, ch. 7.
32. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190.
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is—we’re appointed, not elected, and we’re there for life.” She
emphasizes that foreign law is never cited as binding, and she asks
whether, once that point is accepted, “looking at a decision by Aharon
Barak, Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, is any less democratic
34
than reading a law review piece by a U.S. law professor.”
It is worth distinguishing whatever controversies we have about the
democratic character of judicial review from our controversies about the
materials that are appropriately cited to interpret constitutional
provisions and bills of rights. Even if we had only weak judicial review, of
(say) the British model, we would still have to argue about the place of
precedent, legal scholarship, and foreign sources in our understanding of
35
the relevant provisions.
However, I want to focus on the main line of argument: the
36
epistemic argument based on gaining knowledge from looking abroad.
Justice Ginsburg has pointed us in a fruitful direction. But is it possible to
flesh out the account of what sort of learning is involved and how exactly,
for the purposes of a legal theory or a theory of judicial reasoning, this
learning is supposed to take place? I guess someone might ask whether
we actually need a whole theory. Justice Ginsburg’s account is offered in
37
terms of “comparative side glances” rather than anything grand like a
juridical epistemology. But in fact her observations indicate a number of
ways in which the learning-from-others argument might be elaborated.
Thus, for example, she refers to foreign law as “a pool of potential
38
and useful information,” and we surely want our judicial opinions here
to be well-informed. She implies that foreign law can furnish us with
possible solutions to the legal problems that we face, when our own
menu of solutions looks a little meager:
Other courts are now grappling with problems similar to problems we
confront. Right now, most urgently, the balance between liberty and
security occupies our attention. Would it not be instructive to look at
how the Supreme Court of Israel, for example, has dealt with terrorist
39
cases similar to those now coming before our courts?

She suggests also that reference to foreign law may function
sometimes as a means to test “understanding of one’s own traditions and

33. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L.
Rev. 1033, 1041 (2004).
34. Id.
35. I have pursued this line of argument in Jeremy Waldron, Rights and the Citation of Foreign
Law, in The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays 410 (Tom Campbell et al. eds.,
2011) and in Waldron, All Mankind, supra note 29, ch. 6.
36. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 1040.
37. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 192.
38. Id. at 190 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American
Adjudicative Process, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 439 (2004)).
39. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 1041.
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possibilities by examining them in the [reflected light cast by other legal
40
systems].” Such tests may sometimes be negatively as well as
41
affirmatively suggestive. And at one point she cites the words of Patricia
Wald, saying that reference “to decisions rendered abroad,” may provide
us with indications of “common denominators of basic fairness governing
42
relationships between the governors and the governed.” These are all
highly suggestive remarks. But they are compactly expressed, and I hope
I will not be read as overinterpreting them if I try to expand upon these
observations in the context of this argument about learning from others.

III.
Let us begin with Justice Ginsburg’s idea of “a pool of potential and
43
useful information.” Information about what? All sorts of things go into
a judicial opinion: concepts, insights, empirical evidence, doctrinal tests,
lines of argumentation, rules, principles, the weighing of principles, the
citation and weighing of precedents, interpretive strategies, moral values,
and so on. What category of knowledge is supposed to be in this pool of
potential and useful information, made accessible to us by recourse to
foreign law?
Is it that we can gain empirical insight? Consider Roper v. Simmons,
44
the juvenile death penalty case. The decision was based in large part on
certain propositions in social psychology, to the effect that young people
have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, often resulting in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions; they are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure; and the character of a juvenile is not as well
45
formed as that of an adult. “These differences,” as the Court said,
“render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
offenders” (which of course is the conclusion constitutionally required
46
for the application of the death penalty). But as Ernest Young points
out, the Supreme Court of the United States did not need to learn all
that from its foreign counterparts; our Justices already knew it, because it
was set out at the beginning of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court,
47
long before he got to the issue of foreign law.

40. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 191–92 (quoting Vicki C. Jackson, Comment, Constitutional
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 109, 114 (2005)).
41. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354.
42. Id. (citing Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative
Process, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 439 (2004)).
43. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190.
44. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
45. Id. at 569–70.
46. Id. at 570.
47. See Young, supra note 29, at 148–49.
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Sometimes, however, the empirical material that is needed for
responsible decisionmaking is not available locally. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on Dutch experience
with a scheme of legalized euthanasia to establish a good sense of the
regulatory challenges that would surround the practice and to argue
48
against simply blundering into this area with judicial fiat. And Justice
Ginsburg has suggested that we can become acquainted with some truths
of political science, relevant to our Constitution, from the experience of
other countries with similar structures (and sometimes from their
49
experience with dissimilar structures). As an example, she mentions
Vicki Jackson’s discussion of Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring
50
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, citing, as it did, the
experience of other Western countries with emergency powers
51
arrangements of various kinds.
In her discussion of Vicki Jackson’s work, Justice Ginsburg
mentions also the negative value that information derived from foreign
52
sources may have. Foreign experience with some constitutional
arrangement might help to refute or cast doubt upon commonly accepted
claims in the United States about what the consequences of such
arrangements might be. It is sometimes hard to break out of locally
established mindsets, and reference to foreign law, if undertaken
carefully, can help us do this. As Laurie Ackerman, formerly of the
South African Constitutional Court, once explained,
one can easily become trapped into a sort of tunnel vision, from which
it is difficult to escape, or to see other or lateral answers. . . . It is in this
context that foreign law can play a particularly valuable role. It may be
that, when one commences the enquiry into foreign law one is
psychologically hoping to find confirmation for one’s hypotheses, but if
one remains alive to falsifying possibilities, the foreign law can be of
53
particular value.

This is particularly important to help us move beyond the narrow
language of “confirmation” in Justice Kennedy’s account of the use of

48. 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8, 730, 732, 734–35 (1997).
49. Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354–55.
50. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).
51. Justice Ginsburg discusses congressional testimony given by Vicki Jackson on this matter. See
Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354–55; Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 192–93; see also Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons: The Youngstown Decision and American
Exceptionalism, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 191, 199–200 (2006).
52. Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354; Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 192.
53. Laurie W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa: A Response to Sir
Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 169, 185 (2005). There are similar suggestions, too,
in Sir Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of
Inspiration? 127, 135 (2006), in subheadings such as “When foreign experience . . . help[s] disprove
locally expressed fears about the consequences of a particular legal solution” and “When the foreign
law provides ‘additional’ evidence that a proposed solution has ‘worked’ in other systems.”
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54

foreign law in Roper. It is an old Popperian insight that looking for
possible refutations is epistemically much more respectable in empirical
inquiry, and more productive, too, than just looking smugly for possible
55
confirmations.

IV.
Besides empirical information and analysis, what else can be learned
from the reasoning in a foreign decision? Are we supposed to be able to
glean some new moral insight from a foreign precedent? For example,
did the Court in Roper learn something about the abhorrent nature of
the juvenile death penalty from its survey of its abolition the world over?
Probably not. The pros and cons were pretty well-known in the United
States already, although it is salutary to be reminded of the ferocity with
which the death penalty is condemned in other jurisdictions. It is also
worth ascertaining the moral view that other legal systems take of some
options which seem obvious to us. For example, in the juvenile death
penalty debate, I find that many Americans believe that life
imprisonment without parole is a humane alternative punishment. Few
are aware that other countries adamantly oppose life without parole as
an alternative punishment for murder, certainly as an alternative
punishment for juveniles. They see that, too, as a violation of human
56
rights. So there is some learning to be done here, if not about moral
truth itself, then about the nature and prevalence of certain moral
attitudes that are quite strikingly different from our own and about the
significance of the disparity. The argument is not that we should simply
“fall into line” with a global consensus on this matter. But awareness of
difference is nevertheless the beginning of wisdom, if only because it
provides an occasion for a deeper consideration of what were previously
57
firm, but largely thoughtless, convictions. This must be in large part
what Justice Ginsburg means when she talks about enhancing one’s
“understanding of one’s own traditions and possibilities by examining
58
them in the [reflected light cast by other legal systems].”

54. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”).
55. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 36
(1962).
56. See Dirk van Zyl Smit, Taking Life Imprisonment Seriously in National and
International Law (2002).
57. Justice Breyer’s writing about European doctrines of “the death row syndrome” in his
dissents (from denials of certiorari) in Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999), and Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002), may also fall into this category.
58. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 191–92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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V.
In my view, the most interesting understanding of the epistemology
involved in our courts’ use of foreign law is not empirical information,
not general public policy, and not even moral philosophy (pure or
applied). It is rather a specifically legal epistemology: We stand to gain in
terms of our ability to conduct and engage in legal analysis. I mentioned
above Justice Ginsburg’s observation that American judges are free to
consult and to cite in their opinions “all manner of commentary—
Restatements, Treatises, what law professors or even law students write
59
copiously in law reviews.” When they refer to these sources, judges do
so not for information or moral insight necessarily, but for suggested
pathways of analysis through difficult legal problems.
Lawyers and judges have a particular way of approaching problems.
If you put an issue before a lawyer—such as the juvenile death penalty—
she will (if she has time) carefully take the issue apart, separating the
application of various principles from one another, and laying out in
some logical order a series of hard, interlocking, and quite abstract
questions about the nature of culpability, the use of bright lines (such as
an age of majority), the different functions of adult and juvenile courts,
the in terrorem effects of being tried as an adult, the purposes of
punishment, the rights of victims and their families, the impact of
punishment on a young person (particularly in the way it relates
individual action to outcomes over the course of a whole life), the
connection between the mental element in culpability and the capacity to
foresee the long-term impact of punishment, the purpose of having an
array of penalties from the least to the most severe, and the nature and
safeguards of whatever accompanying discretion might be vested in a
court. A lawyer will lay all of that out and try to figure a way through the
maze of these articulated issues. That is also what we legal scholars do in
(the best of) our law review articles and that, too, is what is done in
doctrinal treatises and restatements (not just in criminal law and
constitutional law, but in areas of private law also).
Something like this sort of analysis is typical of lawyerly thinking
and mentality the world over. We recognize someone as a lawyer as
much by her use of this method as by her citation of codes, statutes, and
precedents, though normally we would expect to see both. No doubt, in
my example, lawyers from different jurisdictions would work through the
issues I have mentioned in a different order, with a different structure.
Some elements might be omitted, some others included, depending on
the particular features of their legal system. They will be guided by the
formal elements of their code or by the doctrines that emerge from the

59. Id. at 193.
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precedents they study. But, one way or another, this is what lawyers’
reasoning is like.
A lawyer, when she confronts a problem, tries to anatomize it,
uncover its underlying structure and the order in which the issues
entangled in the problem are best addressed. In this she is encouraged by
the lawmakers to whose activity she is necessarily responding. For
example, a lawyer’s mode of analysis matches what statute drafters do
when they are writing legislation to address a difficult problem.
Legislators don’t just simply say, “Do this” or “Don’t do that.” They
identify an array of considerations under which conduct, described in a
certain way or having certain characteristics (mental, physical, and
circumstantial), is to be regarded as prohibited or obligatory. Having laid
down a rule in that complex form, legislators might also identify certain
exceptions, which might also be complex in character. Then the statute
will stipulate consequences that are attached to the prohibited activity
(with these characteristics, in these conditions, and absent these
exceptions), consequences that will have a procedural as well as a
substantive aspect. In these ways, a provision of positive law provides a
template for analyzing a messy situation. The idea is that each element of
statutory complexity corresponds to some important piece of the
behavioral or situational jigsaw, so that analyzing a real-world problem
in the way the statutory template indicates is not just a way of falling into
line with the law; it is also a way of guaranteeing that the things
identified and ordered in the analysis are important elements and dealt
with in the structure in an appropriate order of priority. As I say, this is
apparent in complex statutory provisions, but it is apparent also in
common law doctrine and in the tests and elaborations that courts,
responding to their own estimations of what is important, add to the
statutory language to make it capable of dealing adequately with
situations that, whether the drafters foresaw it or not, have to be dealt
with under the auspices of the statutory analysis.
In some circles all this is controversial. Some jurists suggest we
should abandon any pretense of any distinctive and autonomous analytic
60
method for our profession. They think we should retool ourselves and
move to something more like direct public policy advocacy or economic
61
or social analysis. For anyone in this category, what I am saying will be
unconvincing. For them, the learning that takes place when American
judges consult foreign sources can be only empirical or public policy
learning. It cannot be anything distinctively legal. Certainly, one would
not want to push the line I am taking too far. Though I have in mind
specifically legal learning, I am not predicating my argument here on any

60. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 387–405 (1995).
61. Id.
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wholesale resurrection of doctrinal formalism of a Langdellian kind. If
we are summoning up the idea of a distinctly legal epistemology or a
distinctively legal mode of analysis and if we are imagining judges taking
lessons in it from one another across jurisdictional lines, we must show
that this episteme is not simply a word game or an unreal “heaven of
63
concepts,” that we are not just teaching one another new ways of
“trapezing around in [abstract] cycles and epicycles” without coming
64
down to earth on any meaningful grounding.
I actually do think there is substance—quite important substance—
in what I am calling the lawyerly approach, in this way of analyzing and
unpacking issues that lawyers learn and that they can recognize in one
another and help one another with, even when they come from different
countries. What I have called legal epistemology involves analysis and
abstraction, but it is not analysis undertaken for its own sake or
abstraction just because we are comfortable with high-flown words. The
abstract analysis, the unpacking or disentangling of complex problems,
and then their reconstitution into an orderly series of clear questions—all
of this has a point. It helps us pursue concerns about consistency and
fairness, so that we abstract away from superficial characteristics and
deal with deeper and less obvious similarities or differences between one
case and another. We do this because we think issues of fairness are
important even when they are not obvious, and when there are multiple
issues of fairness it is important that they be dealt with in a systematic
way. A passage that Justice Ginsburg cites from Patricia Wald is
important here. Judge Wald suggested that reference to “decisions
rendered abroad” may provide us with indications of “common
denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between the
65
governors and the governed.”
In other words, the lawyer’s method of analysis and abstraction is
important from the point of view of justice. When we take a messy and
complex situation and try to unravel the separate lines of principle that
are involved, we are pulling threads and following leads that involve the
clear identification of the reasons law associates with justice. Clear
analysis and explicit identification of issues is a way of being scrupulous

62. For helpful characterizations of the formalism of the late nineteenth century Harvard law
professor Christopher Columbus Langdell—from which I am trying to distance myself here—see
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev 1 (1983); see also Richard H. Pildes, Forms
of Formalism, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607 (1999). For a modern version of that sort of formalism, see
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949 (1988).
63. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence, in
H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 265 (1983).
64. Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev.
809, 814 (1935).
65. Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 354 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the
American Adjudicative Process, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 439 (2004)).
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in our attention to the reasons that law associates with the just rather
than unjust disposition of cases like the one we are considering. I don’t
mean that the law that gives us these categories is always just. But it
presents itself as aiming at justice, and it presents the methodology it
commands as a way of being maximally responsive in a systematic way to
66
the considerations it defines as key to the justice of the matter.
The two points connect up with one another. When we say that it is
important to treat like cases alike, we mean by “like” the similarities that
seem important or that have seemed important to the law in the past in
regard to the just disposition of cases like this. And so our alertness to
relevant similarities and differences is governed by principles of justice
and focused on what real individuals might have at stake in the issue,
which justice requires us to take into account. It is not consistency for its
own sake that we are looking for, for example the consistency that might
require us to dispose of the one abandoned house on the same basis that
we disposed of another. We want to be consistent because we are dealing
with people. We want cases disposed of consistently because we want to
be fair to the individual persons involved; it is their stakes in the matter
that command our attention, and it is the issues of justice entangled in
their legal positions that our analytic lawyering is trying to unravel.

VI.
What I have just said is important also for understanding foreign
courts’ use of U.S. constitutional law. In a variety of areas, American law
has distinguished itself by developing orderly and fair pathways of
analysis through difficult and serious issues of legal doctrine. I mentioned
already the use made of U.S. First Amendment analysis by a New
67
Zealand court in the case of Hopkinson. It may be helpful to provide
another example—this one from South Africa.
When Nelson Mandela became President in 1994, one of the first
things he did was issue an order for pardon or amnesty freeing all
68
mothers in prison with minor children under the age of twelve years.
66. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 157–66 (1994).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
68. The order stated:
In terms of section 82(1)(k) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 . . . I
hereby grant special remission of the remainder of their sentences to . . . all mothers in
prison on 10 May 1994, with minor children under the age of twelve (12) years . . . .
Provided that no special remission of sentence will be granted for any of the following
offences or any attempt, soliciting or conspiracy to commit such an offence: murder;
culpable homicide; robbery with aggravating circumstances; assault with intent to do
grievous bodily harm; child abuse; rape; any other crimes of a sexual nature; and trading in
or cultivating dependence producing substances.
Presidential Act 17 (1994), cited in President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR
708 (CC) ¶ 2 n.3.
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John Hugo, being a man, was not eligible for the amnesty, although he
met its other conditions: He was serving a fifteen year sentence and he
69
had an eleven-year-old son whose mother had died. So Hugo sued,
complaining that the President’s action violated the constitutional
prohibition on discrimination, disqualifying him from amnesty, as it did,
70
on the ground of sex or gender.
The South African Constitutional Court had to decide (1) whether
this action of the President’s was judicially reviewable, (2) whether it
constituted discrimination against Mr. Hugo, and (3) if it did, whether
there might be extenuating circumstances that would allow the
71
President’s order to stand. The case posed an intriguing tangle of issues.
Is something akin to a presidential pardon reviewable for failing to
conform to some general standard like nondiscrimination? Can an act of
mercy be discriminatory, or unfairly discriminatory, if the applicant has
no right to it, and if—as is clear in a country where male prisoners
outnumber female prisoners by fifty to one—an insistence that men and
women be treated equally in this regard might well lead to no amnesty at
all? Given that women usually occupy a subordinate role in South
African families, and given that they almost always have primary
responsibility for the upbringing of children, can it really be said that a
man is discriminated against by a measure seeking to benefit women
72
prisoners in a specifically family context? If the President’s order is an
infringement of the right to nondiscrimination, is it a justifiable
infringement in terms of the provision that, in the South African
Constitution (as in the bills of rights of many countries the world over),
permits rights to be limited by laws of general application, provided such
73
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic society?
Can an act of amnesty be regarded as a law of general application, and so
on?
One of the striking things about the list of issues I have mentioned is
that on every one of them, Richard Goldstone, who wrote for the
Constitutional Court, and his fellow judges (some concurring in his
decision and some dissenting) referred in detail to the law of other
jurisdictions. They refer to American, German, Irish, Israeli, English,
and other Commonwealth case law on the judicial reviewability of
prerogative actions and the power to pardon, charting a sea change in
69. See Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR ¶ 1.
70. Id. ¶ 3.
71. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 9.
72. Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
73. “The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided
that such limitation—(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is—(i) reasonable; and (ii)
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.” S. Afr. (Interim)
Const., 1993, § 33(1). This provision of the Interim Constitution of 1993, which was in force at the
time, is now replaced by Article 36 (1) of the 1996 final version of the Constitution.
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constitutionalism around the world that has brought executive
74
prerogative powers under the supervision of the rule of law. There is
extensive discussion of the American position on the presidential power
to pardon, including controversies among American judges about the
analogies and differences between the presidency and the position of the
75
English monarch so far as prerogative power is concerned. The judges
refer to Canadian authority on the meaning of discrimination and its
relation to the value of human dignity, particularly the dignity of
76
groups. And several of the judges who considered the application of the
reasonable limitation clause cited Canadian cases as authority for the
proposition that, despite appearances, the presidential order could be
77
regarded as a law of general application. Reading all of the opinions,
one gets a sense of the judges using foreign law to get their bearings
among a tangle of issues—exploring the options and following pathways
pioneered by other courts—to consider various possible models of
analysis.
For what it is worth, the outcome was that the court declined to
78
overturn the President’s decree. The majority (seven judges) reasoned
that although the measure formally discriminated against Mr. Hugo it did
not do so unfairly; the presumption of unfairness was rebutted by the fact
that men did not suffer by the President’s action the loss of any right or
79
legal advantage to which they otherwise would have been entitled. The
court said, “The Presidential Act may have denied them an opportunity
it afforded women, but it cannot be said that it fundamentally impaired
80
their rights of dignity or sense of equal worth.” Three judges thought
the decree did constitute unfair discrimination, but one of them argued
that, as a general measure, it was nevertheless reasonable and justifiable
81
in an open and democratic society. So in the end there were only two
dissenters from the outcome.
The fact that the South African Constitutional Court devoted so
much attention to foreign law should come as no surprise to anyone
familiar with its jurisprudence and its constitutional position. Section 35
of the Interim Constitution, under which Hugo was decided, lays out that
“[i]n interpreting the provisions of this Chapter [Fundamental Rights] a
court of law shall . . . . where applicable, have regard to public
international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See, e.g., Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR ¶¶ 18–27.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶¶ 100–01.
Id. ¶¶ 50–53
Id. ¶ 47.
Id.
See id. ¶ 89.

Waldron_63-HLJ-1243 (Do Not Delete)

June 2012]

GINSBURG AND THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW

6/24/2012 8:29 PM

1259
82

this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.”
That stipulation is continued, too, in the present Constitution in
83
Article 39. One might say that this puts South Africa in a wholly
different position from that of the U.S. Supreme Court: They are
explicitly permitted to cite foreign law, whereas there is no such explicit
permission in the U.S. Constitution, and if some Congressmen had their
way, there would be an explicit prohibition. Still, it is worth asking what
reasons underlie this permission in the South African Constitution and
whether those reasons have any application in countries like the United
States that do not have such an explicit permission.

VII.
Let me take all of this one step further with an analogy. I have long
been intrigued by what one might call “the cosmopolitanism of
scientists”—the way scientists talk about what we know or what we think
we have established, where the “we” doesn’t mean just the scientist
concerned and friends and colleagues in his laboratory, but the whole
84
community of scientists, the world over, understood collectively. We
think the Big Bang happened some ten or twenty billion years ago, but
there are one or two inconsistencies in the theory and some
observational anomalies that we have not figured out. We have a pretty
good account of what causes AIDS and how to mitigate its progress, but
we do not have anything yet in the way of a vaccine. The term “we”
always refers to the consensus of the community of scientists in the
world—scientists who read the same literature, who are aware of one
another’s findings, who check and recheck one another’s results, and who
grapple with research problems in roughly the same terms. It is a
wonderful notion, not least because it involves a cosmopolitan concept of
community, a civilization-wide connection among humans working
85
together.
It is not just a matter of a common method. The “we”-locutions that
I mention are often used to convey a sense of current scientific consensus
on various issues. They purport to represent the current state of scientific
knowledge shared and accredited by laboratories and authorities around
the world. So there is the community of scientists and there is their
consensus for the time being on which theories are valid, which

82. S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993 § 35(1).
83. S. Afr. Const., 1996 § 39(1) (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum . . . must consider international law; and . . . may consider foreign law.”).
84. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 751, 778 (1992).
85. See, e.g., Robert Gascoigne, The Historical Demography of the Scientific Community, 1450–
1900, 22 Soc. Stud. Sci. 545 (1992); see also Struan Jacobs, Scientific Community: Formulations and
Critique of a Sociological Motif, 38 Brit. J. Soc. 266 (1987).
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explanations are adequate, which empirical results are reliable, which
theoretical constructs are useful, and what the current state of play is. No
doubt the consensus is loose—certainly it is continually evolving—but
every scientist the world over thinks in terms of this consensus (and the
community that sustains it) and treats it, if not as the last word on the
issues it addresses, certainly as the prescriptive starting point. An existing
scientific consensus does not claim either unanimity among scientists or
infallibility. Nevertheless, it stands as a repository of enormous value to
individual researchers as they go about their work, and it is unthinkable
that any of them would try to proceed without drawing on that repository
to supplement their own individual research and to provide a basis for its
critique and evaluation. “Where the global community reaches a
relatively strong consensus on a particular question, that consensus [has]
a strong claim to respect as a[n] . . . agreed disciplinary benchmark that
deserves adherence unless a participant in the community can persuade
86
others that the particular starting point is flawed or inapplicable.” No
one in the modern world would take seriously a novel claim about
energy, gravity, or galaxies that did not refer to the work of the scientific
community at large. If one wants to challenge the existing consensus as a
scientist, one necessarily works out from the inside of it, at every stage
submitting one’s results and the inferences drawn from them to be
checked and evaluated by one’s peers.
There is a useful and illuminating analogy between the role played
by consensus and community in science and the role played by consensus
87
and global legal community in law. Scientific consensus is available as a
resource and as a prescriptive starting point for individual scientific
endeavor. And similarly, modes of legal analysis are available to
lawmakers and judges in each individual country as derived from a global
heritage of legal insight, reminding them, in Justice Ginsburg’s words,
that there is a “store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying
88
questions,” that their particular problem has been confronted before,
and that they, like scientists, should try to think it through in the
company of those who have already had to grapple with it. The analogy
is no doubt imperfect—like all analogies, it is not supposed to convey an
impression of equivalence—and I will address some objections to it
below.
First, let me elaborate its implications for the use of foreign law. My
analogy is between scientific and legal analysis and the role played by
global consensus in each. But consider for a moment a more direct—less

86. Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 947,
957 (2008).
87. This was one of the main themes in Waldron, supra note 21, at 132, 138, 143.
88. Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 190.
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analogical—relation between policymaking and the global scientific
consensus.
Consider how we might expect our public health authorities to deal
with a new disease or epidemic appearing within our borders, which we
had never confronted before but which had afflicted other countries. It
would be ridiculous to say that because this problem had arisen in the
United States, we should look only to American science to solve it, as if
to say, “We must never forget that this is an American epidemic we are
fighting.” On the contrary, we would want to look abroad to see what
scientific conclusions and strategies had emerged, what had been tested,
and what possible solutions had been validated in the public health
practices of other countries (and in their relations with one another). Of
course, the choice of any strategy or proposed solution would be in the
end a matter for us. Our scientists would have to take responsibility for
their recommendations and our policymakers for their decisions. But it
would be culpable folly for either group to turn their back on other
countries’ experience and accumulated expertise.
Even if they were convinced that American conditions were
different, with the disease mutating and responding differently to our
particular environment, still they would want to ensure that they
responded rationally to those differences, identifying conditions that
called for an approach unlike those tried in other countries and having
some detailed sense of how to measure and respond proportionately to
the differentiating factors. So even there, we would want to pay attention
to the world’s experience with such differences as the disease had faced
beyond our shores, in order to ensure that we were taking a rational
approach to the differences it exhibited among us.
That is a matter of policy, but it also helps us think through this
business of legal analysis. Justice Ginsburg mentioned the new problems
89
posed in the war against terrorism. But the point applies to legal
problems generally. When we face a novel legal question in the United
States—say a question about the possible implementation of a regime
permitting euthanasia—we need to consider the experience that other
legal systems have had with this problem. Most countries that consider
anything like legalized euthanasia want to maintain a prohibition on
certain forms of encouraging and assisting suicide, and they want to
hedge their assisted suicide regime against abuses and forms of coercive
pressure that might be put upon ailing individuals. They want to do all
that, but they do not want unduly to encumber end-of-life decisions by
individuals who otherwise face the prolonged process of dying in
circumstances of pain and degradation, and they want do to all of this in
a way that accords the greatest respect to individual autonomy and

89. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 1041.
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dignity (mindful of the fact that each of those values points in several
different directions in this problem). The countries of the world are at
90
different stages in working thorough this tangle of issues. Some of the
knowledge about how to think all of this through that is available in the
world is available primarily in the experience of one or two particular
countries; that is why Chief Justice Rehnquist drew extensively on the
experience of the Netherlands in his opinion in Washington v.
91
Glucksberg. Other broad conclusions have emerged or are emerging as
a matter of consensus among those that have experimented with various
permissive regimes: Certain forms of regulation have been found to
work, while others have proved less reliable, so far as protecting
92
vulnerable individuals is concerned. It makes no sense to try to work
through the legal dimensions of this problem in ignorance of both the
individual and accumulated experience of other countries. And I mean
not just experience about what works and what does not, but experience
with the legal analysis of this problem: looking to forms of analysis that
others have pioneered that open the prospect of our being able to
identify and attend methodically to the issues and values that matter in
this tangle. That is the prospect that consensus and juridical community
hold out in the world, and we would be fools not to avail ourselves of it.
Of course, conditions may be different here. Maybe wealthmaximizing Americans are more likely to pressure their elderly relatives
to die. Still, the world has experience of responding to different
conditions, and we would do well to avail ourselves of that experience to
ensure that we are not responding arbitrarily or irrationally to local
peculiarities. It is true, too, that any legal analysis we undertake must in
the first instance respect the constitutional dimensions of these problems.
The federal structure of the United States is a prime example: Is this to
be decided at a federal level or left up to the states? But even on that
point, it is possible that there is something to be learned from other
countries about how to analyze the bearing of federal structure on a
problem such as this—just as we think there is something we can teach
the world from our experience of addressing the federal dimension of the
abortion issue. And, fortunately, our Constitution is sufficiently
capacious in the values it invokes, and in that respect sufficiently like
other bills and charters of rights, so that even while we work within its
provisions, we still find ourselves having to grapple with the same tangle

90. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Democratic
World: A Legal Overview, 16 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2003).
91. 521 U.S. 702, 730, 732, 734–35 (1997).
92. See, e.g., André Janssen, The New Regulation of Voluntary Euthanasia and Medically Assisted
Suicide in the Netherlands, 16 Int’l J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 260 (2002).
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of autonomy-related, dignity-related, and protective issues that other
countries have to grapple with.
So there is the analogy. A scientist does not think of pursuing
research on gravity, energy, or galaxies without reference to the existing
work of the scientific community. She relies on and begins from the
scientific consensus of established and verified results. And the same is
true for law. We do not try to solve these problems as though the world
had never grappled with them before. We pay attention to what other
jurists have done with the issue we face. We treat it as a problem to be
solved by paying attention to the established deliverances of legal
science—the experience, which many legal systems share, of grappling
with, untangling, analyzing, and resolving rival rights and claims,
principles and values that come together in issues of this kind. The idea
of this common body of legal knowledge treats the problems that arise in
our courts as though they were questions for legal science. It does not
93
simply look to “foreign moods, fads, or fashions.” It relies instead on
the idea that solutions to certain kinds of problems in the law might be
established in the way that scientific theories are established. They are
not established as infallible, they change over the years, and there are
always outliers who refuse to accept them—some cranky, and some
whose reluctance leads eventually to progress. But to ignore foreign
solutions, or to refrain from attending to them because they are foreign,
betokens not just an objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to
the nature of the problems we face.
94
I do not claim an equivalence between law and science; my analogy
is oriented specifically to the role that global community and consensus
play in each of two otherwise quite different enterprises. For of course
there are very considerable differences between the scientific epistemology
and the epistemology of law. The point is that in each case, in science and
also in law, there is a shared methodology underwritten by some sort of
global community. It is community on that scale that enables scientists
from one country to talk to one another, to share a sense of common
enterprise, and to recognize and assist one another with their common
methodology. And I believe it is something analogous that enables
lawyers, jurists, and judges from one country to share a sense of common
enterprise with lawyers, jurists, and judges from another country.
Nor am I advocating a consensus theory of truth for either law or
science. The scientific community’s consensus for the time being is
always understood to be fallible, and it is judged in the last analysis by
93. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(“[T]his Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions
on Americans.”).
94. Cf. Roger P. Alford, Free Speech and the Case for Constitutional Exceptionalism, 106 Mich. L.
Rev. 1071, 1085 (2008).
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criteria of external truth. (Some philosophical skeptics may quibble with
that, but my position is not built on that sort of skepticism.) And it is
precisely because they are trying to describe and explain a theory- and
mind-independent world that the whole business of checking and
rechecking and endeavoring to duplicate one another’s experimental
results is so important. Engagement with community and attention to
consensus are like mandatory heuristics relative to the pursuit of truth. In
science they are not the point of the exercise, but they are indispensable
to it. The consensus and community that I have in mind, then, comprise
not just an accumulation of authorities but a dense network of checking
and rechecking results, experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual
elaboration, and building on one another’s work. Neither of these
communities offers any guarantees so far as the overall aim of the
enterprise is concerned: truth in the case of science, justice or right in the
case of law. A consensus in either field can be wrong. Still, in neither
field is there a sensible alternative to paying attention to the established
body of findings to which others have contributed over the years.
James Allan has argued that my analogy with science “suggests that
the legal consensus of [foreign] judges somehow sits atop a body of mind95
independent . . . truths, as it does in the scientific realm.” And that, he
thinks, makes no sense at all. Judges are not trying to access mindindependent truth in their deliberations in the way that scientists are, and
even if they were, there is no mind-independent truth, corresponding to
96
their assertions about justice or right, for them to access. On that basis
Allan thinks my analogy is entirely inappropriate.
But one does not have to be a believer in the philosophy of
objective right answers in law to accept the analogy I am offering.
Whether one is a philosophical objectivist or not, one likely will proceed
in argument and analysis as though it mattered to deal competently and
in an orderly and consistent fashion with issues of rightness and justice.
That is why the observation that Justice Ginsburg quoted from Patricia
Wald is so important. We care about the fairness and consistency of our
decisionmaking and because of that, we have reason to look to what
Judge Wald called “common denominators of basic fairness governing
relationships between the governors and the governed” in the analyses
97
that we deploy. And when we consider that we are not the first to care
95. James Allan, Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s Stone, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 133, 141
(2008).
96. Id. at 146 (“Waldron’s attempt to harness for the realm of law the same sense of solid,
objective, timeless knowledge that exists . . . in the realm of the natural sciences is not successful. If
American judges ought to . . . consider . . . the consensus of opinion of foreign judges, it cannot be
because that consensus represents what it does in the natural sciences, namely the currently existing
best understanding by us limited, biological humans of the underlying, mind-independent reality of
our external causal world.”).
97. Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process,
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about legal analysis for this reason in a given legal context, we will want
to look at how other responsible reasoners have worked their way fairly
and consistently through the issues that we have to address. Maybe
someone who thinks of law and judicial decisionmaking as just a matter
of will, a matter of arbitrary fiat, will struggle to see the point of this. But
anyone who cares about legal reasoning will want to be less abrupt and
better informed than that.
Of course we know that people disagree about the first principles of
justice and rightness and that they may bring different conceptions of
these values to any particular exercise in legal analysis. In theory, then, a
conservative judge approaching (say) assisted suicide or the juvenile
death penalty will approach those problems with different sentiments
and perhaps with a different sense of what counts as an adequate analysis
compared with a liberal judge. If the conservative were to engage in an
inquiry into foreign law he might use the products of his inquiry in a
different way than would his liberal counterpart. That is not to say that
the two of them might not both learn something from that inquiry,
though it may not be the same thing. But it is also perfectly possible that
they may both benefit in the same way from paying attention to decisions
elsewhere in the world. For the propositions that they are grappling with
need not be the ultimate loci of their moral or ideological disagreements.
Often what legal analysis focuses on is the bearing on a tangled situation
of intermediate principles that may well be shared by those who disagree
about ultimate values. They may be shared either because these
intermediate principles represent a sort of plateau of moral common
sense, or they may be shared because the two opposed judges are
required by the law to address a common question—say, about the
cruelty of a given punishment (even if only one of them thinks in his
heart that cruelty is a bad thing in a punishment) or about equal
protection (even if one of them is, at base, not an egalitarian). The two of
them may still think themselves bound to analyze the bearing of one—or
several—of these principles on a tangled legal problem, and they may
both welcome and profit from the assistance that a global consensus
provides in indicating what counts as a respectable and disciplined way to
conduct such analysis.

VIII.
In this Article, I have taken various observations and insights from
Justice Ginsburg’s consideration of the practice of citing foreign law, and
I have tried to elaborate, in my own terms, the points that she has made
and to explore some of the directions in which she has pointed us. I hope
I have not been guilty of putting words into her mouth. Most of the
27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 431, 442 (2004).
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comments here are mine, and of course I take responsibility for whatever
fallacies and exaggerations they may involve. But I offer it to her
nevertheless in the spirit of the best tribute that can be paid to a thinker
in jurisprudence (in fact, in any intellectual endeavor). The thing to do is
not just to echo or repeat another’s views, but to build on them—to pick
up the ball that has been passed and run with it for a little while. We
need, as I have said, much more in the way of reflection and theory on
this matter of the citation and use of foreign law. Justice Ginsburg’s
observations are a beginning, and this Article is a pursuit of that beginning.

